






What’s the Matter with Super-Humeanism?
William M. R. Simpson
Abstract
Esfeld has proposed a minimalist ontology of nature called ‘super-Humeanism’ that pur-
ports to accommodate quantum phenomena and avoid standard objections to neo-Humean
metaphysics. I argue that Esfeld’s sparse ontology has counterintuitive consequences and
generates two self-undermining dilemmas concerning the nature of time and space. Con-
trary to Esfeld, I deny that super-Humeanism supports an ontology of microscopic particles
that follow continuous trajectories through space.
1 Introduction
2 Matter without Physical Properties
2.1 The primitive ontology approach
2.2 Super-Humean matter points






In this article I offer some critical reflections on Esfeld’s ‘super-Humean’ metaphysics of
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structuralism realism. According to Esfeld, the world of macroscopic objects is composed of
microscopic particles, which are distributed according to a law of nature specified by Bohmian
mechanics. This law explains the ‘non-local’ measurement outcomes associated with quantum
experiments, such as the famous EPR experiment involving two quantum-entangled particles.
Super-Humeanism offers a supervenience base for this law consisting of a changing configu-
ration of matter points, which have no intrinsic physical properties or causal powers, but are
constituted solely by the distance relations in which they stand.
While Esfeld’s super-Humean ontology is elegantly simple, and avoids a standard objection
to neo-Humean metaphysics from ‘quidditism’, I claim that it is susceptible to a ‘symmetric
worlds’ problem, and to self-undermining dilemmas concerning both its conception of primitive
change and its persistence conditions for Bohmian particles. I conclude that this primitive
ontology is too sparse to offer a plausible account of nature.
2 Matter without Physical Properties
2.1 The primitive ontology approach
Super-Humeanism rejects the ‘classical’ conceit that physical properties, like mass and charge,
are intrinsic properties of particles (or fields). This rejection is motivated in part by Schrödinger’s
([1935]) description of quantum entanglement as ‘the characteristic trait of quantum mechan-
ics’ that compels a ‘departure from classical lines of thought’. The phenomenon of quantum
entanglement troubles the classical picture of the world in two ways. First, it gives rise to
‘non-separable’ systems, in which the state of two quantum-entangled systems cannot be de-
composed into the states of their separate parts. Second, it gives rise to ‘non-local’ phenomena,
in which what happens at some point P in space depends not only upon what exists in the past
light cone of this event, but also upon what exists at points in space which are separated from
P by a space-like interval.
For example, in the famous EPR experiment involving two quantum-entangled particles
emitted from a common source, one particle is measured to be ‘spin-up’ when another is mea-
sured simultaneously to be ‘spin-down’, and vice versa, however far apart the two particles are
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set up to register ‘vertical spin’ (that is, ‘spin-up’ or spin-down’), but the polarization angles
of these devices, φA and φB, can be adjusted separately to produce a range of experimental
outcomes. Significantly, quantum mechanics predicts that the statistics for this experiment will
depend on the relative angle between them: φA − φB. This is something that neither particle,
considered separately, is in a position to ‘know’, given the ban on superluminal signalling in
modern physics.
Bell’s theorem (Bell [1964]) is generally taken by physicists to have established that the
measurement outcomes of the EPR experiment cannot be accounted for by assuming that each
quantum-entangled particle carried classical values, which are local magnitudes of the system
that were available to be measured separately all along. More precisely, such ‘no-hidden vari-
ables theorems’ imply that we cannot infer the microscopic properties possessed by a physical
system from its ‘local observables’, and that measurements are interactions that significantly
disturb its quantum state (Lazarovici et al. [2018]).
In order to offer an empirically adequate account of the non-local measurement outcomes
of quantum experiments, while avoiding the notorious ‘measurement problem’ of quantum
mechanics, super-Humeans adopt a primitive ontology approach to Bohmian mechanics (Esfeld
[2014b]), which posits a finite configuration of N particles that occupy different positions, Q =(
Q1, ,QN
)
, and specifies a law of motion that determines their trajectories (Dürr et al. [1992],
[1997]). This law does not depend upon the particles having intrinsic properties (Esfeld et al.
[2013]), but upon a universal wave function ψ, which evolves according to the Schrödinger
equation. The physical state of a system of particles q ∈ Q can be specified by a tuple pairing
an effective wave function with the positions of the particles: (q, ψ)t.
Bohmians explain the non-separability of quantum systems, and the non-local measurement
outcomes of the EPR experiment, by embracing a form of holism in which the trajectories of
all particles are choreographed by the Bohmian law of motion. Fixing the polarization angle
of the apparatus in one wing of the EPR experiment influences the trajectory of the particle
in the other wing via the wave function, which induces a velocity profile vψ(t) for all of the
particles, including those particles composing the two measuring devices, which accounts for
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be measured without simultaneously disturbing their wave function, an ontology of particles
is defended by appealing to the ‘discrete’ nature of the phenomena that scientists observe in
experiments (Esfeld and Deckert [2017], p. 5). According to Bohmians, ‘all measurements
come down to position measurements’ (Lazarovici et al. [2018], p. 1). Since the ‘classical
value’ Q of the global configuration of particles cannot be measured, Bohmian mechanics is
empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics.
In a Bohmian world, the pointers of our measuring devices are patterns of particles which
instantiate this law. However, while the wave function is supposed to be merely a feature of
how Bohmians represent the dynamics of quantum systems (Solé [2013]), the universal wave
function ψ at time t does not supervene upon the global particle configuration Q at time t. The
wave function thus represents some matter of fact over and above the particle positions at t, and
scientific realists who adopt a primitive ontology approach to Bohmian mechanics must specify
an adequate supervenience base for the Bohmian law of motion that accounts for the truth of
quantum mechanics.
2.2 Super-Humean matter points
Super-Humeanism combines the primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics with ontic
structural realism to produce a minimalist ontology defined by two axioms:
1. There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely, matter points.
2. These matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing.
The primitive ontology consists of the matter points. The ontic structure consists of the distance
relations. The matter points do not exist over and above this structure, since there is nothing
more to being a matter point than its standing in certain distance relations. However, the world
is not made of relations without relata. Rather, these matter points are the fundamental objects
that instantiate this ontic structure. In this model, macroscopic objects, like measuring de-
vices, are individuated by their microscopic matter points, while matter points are holistically
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In order to explain how physical systems made of matter points change, for the sake of
empirical adequacy, Esfeld is compelled to expand the supervenience base. Since distance re-
lations are supposed to establish the order of what coexists in nature, he takes up Leibniz’s
relationalist definition of space. Since these distance relations constitute particles that change
their positions, he follows Leibniz in conceiving time as the order of that change. Esfeld must
therefore sort his supervenience base into an infinite number of time-slices by imposing a lin-
ear ordering, in which each time-slice contains a complete assignment of distance relations
between all of the matter-points that exist at that time. To give a direction to this linear order-
ing, which explains why one time-slice should follow another, he must also include a primitive
arrow of change.
Since super-Humeans follow the Mill–Ramsey–Lewis account of laws, they consider the
Bohmian law of motion (or something like it) to be a universal law of nature only insofar as
it is an axiom in the ‘best system’ that balances strength and simplicity in deriving the facts
about how matter points are distributed for all time. However, since scientific practices are typ-
ically aimed at investigating interactions that take place within isolated physical systems, they
must find other ways of representing how systems change. Super-Humeans treat the physical
properties of systems, like mass and charge, in the same way that classical neo-Humeans treat
powers: such properties are conceptual decorations, rather than objective features of nature,
which may feature as part of a ‘best system’ account that offers a simple and informative way
to represent change (Esfeld [2014a]).
3 Objections to Super-Humeanism
Super-Humeanism offers a simple account of non-local quantum phenomena in terms of a
holistic law of nature, which supervenes upon and is wholly made true by a linearly ordered
set of time-slices composed of matter points. By eliminating all of the causally redundant and
unknowable qualities that featured in the neo-Humean metaphysics of Lewis, Esfeld’s mini-
mal ontology avoids a common objection to neo-Humeanism from ‘quidditism’. Nonetheless,
super-Humeanism creates some problems of its own.
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with a ‘starving ontology’, on the grounds that ‘distance relations’ fail to offer a plausible foun-
dation of space and time. However, Lazarovici ([2018], p. 82) recognizes that super-Humeans
who are committed to parsimony are unlikely to be moved by such objections, and briefly raises
the question of whether super-Humeanism might also suffer from internal conceptual problems
due its conception of matter. I explore this worry here by posing three metaphysical objections
to super-Humeanism.
3.1 Symmetric worlds
My first objection concerns an implausible modal commitment that follows from its structural-
ist conception of matter. I shall argue that it leads to the contradiction that distinct particles
in symmetric configurations are in fact identical. This argument turns on the claim that, if
super-Humeanism is true, then it is metaphysically impossible that two distinct particles could
be constituted by the same set of distance relations. In other words, super-Humeanism is com-
mitted to the principle of constituent identity:
Super-Humean principle of constituent identity (PCI): If Particle 1 is constituted by the
same set of distance relations as Particle 2, then Particles 1 and 2 are identical.
However, the principle of constituent identity entails a controversial principle:
Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII): If object O1 has a property if
and only if object O2 does too, then O1 and O2 are identical.
This claim is not to be confused with Leibniz’s law, which is often referred to as the princi-
ple of the indiscernibility of identicals. According to this law, where there are instances of
incompatible properties, there must correspondingly be distinct objects. (PII) is both logically
independent of Leibniz’s law and more controversial: the sparser one’s theory of constituents,
the easier it is for objects to be indiscernible, and hence the easier it is to satisfy the identity
condition imposed by (PII). In a sparse ontology, there are fewer properties that can explain
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A super-Humean cannot appeal to intrinsic physical properties, since super-Humeanism
admits only ontic structure within its supervenience base. However, its supervenience base is
extremely sparse, since the only perfectly natural constituents it admits are distance relations.
Super-Humeanism thus depends upon the following form of the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles:
Super-Humean Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (SPII): If object O1 stands in a
distance relation to some object Oi if and only if object O2 does too, then O1 is identical
to O2.
However, this principle leads to implausible results that come at a theoretical cost. This objec-
tion can be made more forcefully by means of the following argument:
(i) Suppose there are three non-identical particles, 1, 2, and 3, separated by distances d12, d13
and d23, and suppose they trace a locus such that d12 = d23.
(ii) If super-Humeanism is true, then Particle 1 is identical to the matter point constituted by
the relations {d12, d13}, and Particle 3 is identical to the matter point constituted by the
relations {d23, d13}.
(iii) Therefore, super-Humeanism implies Particle 1 is identical to Particle 3 (by (i) and (ii)).
(iv) Therefore, super-Humeanism is false (by (i) and (iii)).
The second premise is simply a restatement of that form of the principle of the indiscernibility
of identicals to which super-Humeans are unavoidably committed (SPII). The argument hangs,
then, by the first premise, which may be rephrased as the modal claim that it is possible for
there to be two non-identical particles that stand in the same distance relations.
I make this claim on the basis that we can conceive possible scenarios in which there are
two particles that stand in the same distance relations. In fact, physicists frequently do so
in considering textbook examples, such as the cases of spatially homogeneous and isotropic
cosmological models, in which all of the particles, by the above reasoning, would be identical
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commonly held assumption that the conceivability of some state of affairs offers evidence for
its possibility, albeit only a defeasible kind of evidence.
The evidence required for the first premise is easy to come by. For example, consider a
world in which Particles 1 and 3 are making a circular orbit of the same radius around Particle
2. In such a world, the distance between Particles 1 and 2 is identical to the distance between
Particles 2 and 3, hence d12 = d23. While this scenario is perfectly conceivable, and such a
system can be modelled straightforwardly using quantum mechanics, super-Humeanism en-
tails that there is no possible world in which it could ever be realized. It cannot be realized
because the supervenience base in a super-Humean world is too sparse to individuate Parti-
cles 1 and 3. This counts as evidence for the first premise, in support of the conclusion that
super-Humeanism is false.
Such scenarios are commonly referred to as ‘Max Black’ worlds, which are possible worlds
that contain indiscernible objects that we have reason nonetheless to consider distinct (Black
[1952]). In Black’s original example, we are asked to imagine a world with two distinct but
qualitatively indiscernible spheres that stand one mile apart. In fact, the number of Max Black
worlds that can be offered in evidence against super-Humeanism may be multiplied ad infini-
tum by conceiving any number of symmetric configurations of particles in which many of the
particles stand in identical sets of distance relations.
This generalization of my argument against super-Humeanism is analogous to Hawthorne’s
criticisms of causal structuralism (Hawthorne [2001]), in which he distinguishes two forms
of structuralism. According to the strong form (as I shall call it), two things are identical if
they play identical roles in a structure, where the roles that they play are defined abstractly
without reference to the identities of things in the structure. According to the weak form, the
roles that they play are defined concretely in terms of relations to relata whose identities are
independent of their roles. Hawthorne’s criticisms are directed toward the strong form of causal
structuralism, in which a natural property is supposed to have an individual essence consisting
of nothing over and above its ‘causal profile’. This view is troubled by intra-world duplications
of causal profiles resulting from the possibility of symmetric structures. However, Hawthorne
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the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a particular property are specified in terms of
its relations to other properties, while properties have identities independently of their causal
roles. For the weak form to be viable, a property must have a quiddity that exists over and
above its causal profile.
Similarly, super-Humeanism advances a strong form of structuralism, in which a particle
has an individual essence consisting of nothing over and above its ‘distance profile’ (so to
speak). This view is troubled by intra-world duplications of distance profiles resulting from the
possibility of symmetric configurations. A weak form of structuralism, in this case, would be
one in which the matter points have identities over and above the structure of distance relations
they instantiate. For this view to be viable, each particle would require an haecceity that exists
over and above its distance profile.
This parallel move, however, is unavailable to super-Humeans, since it would require the
abandonment of ontic structural realism. If the featureless particles of Bohmian mechanics
have an identity over and above their distance relations, they cannot be constituted solely by
distance relations. If each of the matter points which inst ntiate these relations has an haecceity,
this configuration is not an ontic structure. Yet if the Bohmian particles are constituted neither
by properties nor relations, and they have no haecceities over and above the distance relations
in which they stand, it is unclear how they are supposed to exist as distinct objects at all.
An alternatively strategy is to appeal to the ‘weak discernibility’ of particles in symmet-
ric configurations. Two objects may be said to be weakly discernible if they stand in some
irreflexive relation (Quine [1976]). Saunders ([2003], [2006]) has argued that, while we should
retain the principle of identity of indiscernibles, it is sufficient that physical particles should be
weakly discernible in order for them to count as distinct objects. A distance relation is an ex-
ample of such a relation: the two spheres in Black’s original example, for instance, are weakly
discernible, since each object is one mile from the other, but is not one mile from itself. The
examples used by Saunders to illustrate his claim are drawn from quantum mechanics: two
particles in the singlet state (Equation 1) may be considered weakly discernible, insofar as each
particle ‘spins’ in the opposite direction to the other, but not in the opposite direction to itself.
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there are also quantum-entangled states involving bosons, which are positively correlated with
respect to their spin. These particles are not weakly discernible.
However, Hawley ([2006]) has argued that the claim that objects are distinct just in case they
are weakly discernible is unmotivated. Noting that Saunders is effectively using (PII) to settle
the ‘inverse special composition question’ and decide when quantum-entangled systems may be
considered to have basic constituents, Hawley observes that an appeal to weak discernibility is
merely an appeal to the fact that positing basic constituents is not forbidden by (PII). To argue
that we should actually posit basic constituents in such cases is to invoke a supplementary
principle: we should posit the existence of basic constituents whenever this is not forbidden by
(PII).
Hawley offers three objections to adopting this supplementary principle. First, it seems
arbitrary to regard the relation of being-of-the-opposite-spin as a ‘better or worse claim to on-
tological basicness’ than the relation of being-of-the-same-spin. On such a basis, Saunders
claims that fermions are distinct objects but bosons are not. Second, it leads to arbitrary divi-
sions within physical systems. For example, a system with four units of charge, according to
this principle, could be partitioned into two basic constituents, where the first has a single unit
of charge, and the second has three units. Third, maintaining both (PII) and the supplementary
principle involves holding conflicting motivations: (PII) favours mereological simplicity over
complexity, by restricting our ontology to the minimum requirements of Leibniz’s law, whereas
the supplementary principle prefers mereological complexity over simplicity, whenever we can
get away with it.
While Leibniz’s law requires us to recognize the non-identity of physical systems that in-
stantiate incompatible properties, Hawley notes that apparent heterogeneity might correspond
to modifications of a single entity instead. In the eyes of an ontological monist, the original
Max Black world might be viewed as a single object that is spatially disconnected. Likewise,
the universe might be viewed as something which, at some moment of time, just happens to
be positively-charged-here-and-negatively-charged-there. Alternatively, since Leibniz’s law is
logically independent of (PII), we might favour a model in which the particles in a quantum-
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ticles with haecceities and rejecting the role of distance relations as basic constituents. Thus the
super-Humean, in confronting the problem of symmetric worlds, is presented with a trilemma:
The Symmetric Worlds Trilemma: Either (i) posit particles with haecceities, or (ii) at-
tribute distinct particle configurations to different modifications of a single object, or (iii)
deny the existence of symmetric configurations.
Since super-Humeans cannot appeal to particles with haecceities without rejecting ontic struc-
tural realism, and since strict ontological monism is incompatible with the primitive ontology
approach to quantum mechanics, they must take the third horn of the dilemma, and deny that
symmetric configurations of particles could exist in any possible world. They must maintain
this doubtful posture in spite of the fact that the dynamical equations of physical theories ad-
mit symmetrical solutions, and the particles comprising a super-Humean world would have an
eternity in which to explore their configuration space. This prohibition must extend to solu-
tions in which the configuration of particles is momentarily symmetric at certain times, or risk
affirming the bizarre possibility of a ‘peekaboo’ cosmos whose particle configuration vanishes
at certain times.
The symmetric worlds problem for super-Humeanism has its roots in what Keränen ([2001])
introduced as ‘the identity problem’ in the philosophy of mathematics. On the one hand, sym-
metries are supposed to be a guide to the ontic structures, insofar as it is the structures of two
rival theories with different ideologies but isomorphic structures that are taken to be ontic by
structural realists. Such theories are acknowledged to be true by structural realists only ‘up to
an isomorphism’. On the other hand, the ontic structures are also supposed to individuate the
objects in the ontology, insofar as ontic structuralists are not eliminativists about objects. For
super-Humeans, the ontic structure consists solely of distance relations, and the objects are the
particles referred to by Bohmian mechanics. However, as Keränen points out, such structures
cannot both be symmetrical and individuating.
Esfeld is aware that symmetric configurations present a difficulty for his metaphysical
model, but thinks super-Humeans should bite the bullet and deny that symmetries are a guide to








niversity of St Andrew







William M. R. Simpson What’s the Matter with Super-Humeanism?
claim to be only in the business of describing the actual world. Second, super-Humeans might
simply deny that symmetric configurations of its particles are in fact conceivable.
With respect to the first move, super-Humeans might seek to justify the exclusion of entirely
symmetric worlds by observing that the actual world is obviously not symmetrical (at least, as
far as we can tell), and by pointing out that all physical theories have surplus mathematical
structure (Esfeld and Deckert [2017], p. 69). For example, the solution to the Klein–Gordon
equation is the difference between a ‘retarded’ and an ‘advanced’ Green’s function, but the
advanced Green’s function is typically discarded for problems involving time. According to
super-Humeans, we should likewise regard symmetric solutions to the dynamical equations of
physical theories as ‘mathematical surplus’, which have no bearing on what the world is like.
Nonetheless, the rejection of a solution to an equation of motion typically concurs with
our modal intuitions, while our modal intuitions usually concur in finding symmetric solutions
to be possible. For example, cosmologists who have contemplated the famous Friedmann-
Lemaître-Robertson-Walker solutions to Einstein’s field equations during the course of their
careers, which describe homogeneous and isotropic spacetimes, have apparently considered
them possible.1 Moreover, in effectively banning symmetric configurations from the past or
future, the super-Humean is not merely describing the world as we find it—‘Just the facts,
ma’am’, like any law-abiding Humean—but prescribing how particles should behave in all
possible worlds with the same laws. Ironically, in seeking to produce an account of nature that
is more Humean than neo-Humeanism, Esfeld has committed himself to a strong modal claim.
A committed super-Humean, then, is likely to challenge the uniformity of the evidence of
our modal intuitions. Whereas philosophers like Wüthrich may take the metaphysical possi-
bility of symmetrical configurations for granted, super-Humeans may claim to be unable to
conceive perfectly symmetric configurations, along with philosophers like Hacking ([1975])
and Belot ([2001]). More precisely, such philosophers claim that we have no reason to think
that this is the correct description of what it is that we imagine, when we suppose ourselves to
be imagining symmetric worlds. Super-Humeans will thus maintain that there is no possible
world that must be described in a way that is incompatible with (PII).
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Nonetheless, the super-Humean refusal to take symmetry as a guide to the ontic structures
comes at the cost of isolating their primitive ontology from any input from the empirical sci-
ences, leaving super-Humeans with ontological parsimony or simplicity as their only metaphys-
ical guide. This is the cause of Lazarovici’s ([2018]) complaint in labelling super-Humeanism
a ‘one-trick pony’, since the determined super-Humean will only argue that, if the criterion of
ontological simplicity is properly elevated, it will uniquely favour their primitive ontology. I
intend to be less generous than Lazarovici. In what follows, I offer reasons for thinking the
pony will stumble in performing its only trick.
3.2 Temporal dilemma
My second objection calls into question whether super-Humeanism can offer a realist account
of the laws of nature, given its structuralist conception of matter and its notion of primitive
change. I shall argue that these two commitments lead to a dilemma between two contrary
views of time: the so-called A-theory of time, which posits an absolute distinction between
past, present, and future; and the ‘B-theory’, which denies the existence of such a distinction
(McTaggart [1908]).
On the one hand, super-Humeans require that particle configurations should change for the
sake of empirical adequacy, and they require this change to be primitive. They cannot appeal
to the so-called At-At theory of change advanced by Russell ([1903], pp. 469–73),2 in which
something changes by instantiating different properties at different times, because they reject
the claim that the particles are characterized by intrinsic properties. Rather, super-Humeans
embraces a structuralist conception of particles, in which particles are constituted by distance
relations. Likewise, super-Humeans cannot embed the particle configurations as points within
a primitive spacetime, because they adopt a Leibnizian conception of space, in which physical
space is also constituted by distance relations.
Nor is it sufficient for super-Humeans to adopt a B-series of configurations, minus the usual
background conception of spacetime, without explaining how the time-slices comprising this
series are supposed to be individuated as temporal parts of a single structure. Super-Humeans
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claim that all of the matter points at a moment of time must be holistically individuated by
the intra-structural relations that constitute a particular configuration, because they lack any
intrinsic properties. Since these configurations also lack intrinsic properties, over and above
their constituents, it seems that they would also have to be holistically individuated, in order to
instantiate inter-structural relations across time-slices within a stack of configurations.
However, as Lazarovici ([2018]) points out, the relations that constitute both the particle
configurations and the physical space in which they move are directionless, structureless and
dimensionless.3 As such, it seems that any binary relation might count as ‘temporal’. In that
case, it is difficult to see how super-Humeans who adopt a B-series of configurations can explain
the structure of time. For instance, a scientist who sets up a measuring apparatus to measure the
positions of particles, before measuring their positions, then makes the measurement, before
writing the result down, does not set up the apparatus after writing the result down, nor make the
measurement before setting up the apparatus. Yet why should the temporal order be transitive
and anti-symmetric in a world made solely of distance relations? It is also difficult to see how
super-Humeans can explain the difference between primitive change in the configuration of
the particles, and a variation in their distribution along some dimension, without appealing to
additional brute matters of fact. In the context of super-Humeanism, McTaggart’s claim that
only the A-theory can deliver real change gains force, as the theoretical cost of adopting a
B-series begins to climb.4
In short, in order to get these Bohmian particles to change their configuration, it seems
super-Humeans will have to ‘clear the deck’ of one set of distance relations, before replacing it
with another. This suggests super-Humeans should adopt something like the A-theory of time,
in which there is only one configuration of particles that exists at the present moment. (This
appears to be Esfeld’s position.)5
3Lazarovici ([2018], p. 82) complains that space is ‘lost’ by reducing all geometric structure to
distance relations: ‘There is nothing about the distance relations that would make them 3-dimensional
[. . . ] or put any other constraints on the dimension, curvature or topology of the physical geometry’.
4McTaggart ([1908]) claimed there can be no real or primitive change in the block-universe
conceived in the B-theory of time, although many philosophers have disagreed with his claim.
5See (Esfeld and Deckert [2017], pp. 151–2): ‘change exists, but not a whole ordered stack of
configurations [. . . ] Presentism, thus conceived, is the most simple and parsimonious ontology, since
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On the other hand, super-Humeans require the existence of an adequate supervenience base
for the wave function, which must include facts about potential configurations for all of time.
In Esfeld’s view, this base is composed of an infinite number of time-slices, in which each time-
slice consists of an arrangement of matter points. He requires the existence of such an extensive
base because a law that includes the wave function does not supervene upon, and is not wholly
made true by, the distribution of particles at a particular time. Of course, all Humeans who toy
with presentism will face the problem of finding truth-makers for propositions about entities
that do not supervene upon what exists at the present moment, such as universal laws of na-
ture. However, there is an additional complication for super-Humeans seeking to accommodate
quantum phenomena.
To bring out this difference, consider how the laws are represented in a classical world, ac-
cording to neo-Humeans, and in a quantum world, according to super-Humeans. In a classical
world, one configuration of properties Pi follows regularly from another P j according to a law
L : Pi → P j that refers to distinct configurations of properties instantiated in the world at differ-
ent times. However, in a quantum world, a best systems account of the world will include only
positions and a wave function, which change from moment to moment, L : (Qi, ψi)→ (Q j, ψ j),
while super-Humeans will insist there is nothing besides matter points which may serve as
referents.
Yet matter points are constituted by nothing but distance relations: they have no intrinsic
physical properties, since properties are on the same level as the wave function, which is merely
part of the ‘best system’ account of how these matter points are distributed for all time. It
follows that the truth of any propositions that pick out objects by their physical properties,
including microscopic objects such as electrons with properties like mass and charge, will fail
to supervene upon what exists at the present moment, but will depend for their truth upon
nothing less than the whole stack of configurations for all time.
In short, in order to secure the supervenience base of the wave function, it seems super-
Humeans will have to ‘join the dots’ by uniting each particle configuration as temporal parts of
a single structure. This suggests super-Humeans should adopt the B-theory of time, in which
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which it is part. However, if super-Humeanism entails both the A-theory and the B-theory of
time, then it contains a flagrant contradiction. It appears, then, that super-Humeans are caught
on the horns of a dilemma:
Temporal Dilemma: Either (i) embrace the B-theory, by retaining eternalism, but aban-
doning Leibnizian space, or (ii) embrace the A-theory, by retaining primitive change, but
denying eternalism.
To take the first horn of this dilemma, by embracing the B-theory of time, would be to
abandon the minimalism of super-Humeanism. On the one hand, super-Humeans might form
a B-series of configurations by embracing a substantival conception of spacetime. In doing so,
however, they would introduce a difficulty concerning how the distance relations that constitute
the particle configuration are to be embedded in spacetime without abandoning their structural-
ist characterization of matter. Yet to abandon either the Leibnizian conception of space, or the
strong form of structuralism, would be to abandon super-Humean minimalism, which claims
that its world-making relations are sufficient for constituting a world of physical objects.
On the other hand, super-Humeans might try to construct a B-series of configurations by
adopting the so-called moving spotlight theory of time, which combines the eternalism found
in the B-theory with the notion of objective becoming found in the A-theory.6 In this case, we
might think of the world as consisting eternally of a block of facts about distance relations in
different time-slices, while requiring the existence of ‘presentness’ as a property of a time-slice,
along with the properties of ‘pastness’ and ‘futurity’. Primitive change in a block-universe may
then be understood in terms of the instantiation of these properties. However, setting aside
the problems that have been raised with the moving spotlight theory of time (Sider [2001],
Section 2.1), such a move also violates super-Humean minimalism: by stipulation, there are no
primitive or intrinsic properties in nature.
To take the second horn of the dilemma, however, by embracing the A-theory, would be
to abandon the truth of a law of nature that includes the wave function, as well as the truth of
propositions that refer to the physical objects that scientists interact with in their experiments.
On the one hand, super-Humeans might attempt to compress the facts upon which they depend,
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by making facts about future time-slices depend upon facts about the primordial past (that is,
a past time-slice). However, according to super-Humeans, there are no necessary connections
between any of the time-slices. On the other hand, super-Humeans might attempt to soften the
requirements of realism, by claiming that the truth of the laws of nature could be fixed at the
end of the world (that is, a future time-slice). Super-Humeanism might then be reconciled with
the A-theory of time by appealing to memory: just as the present configuration of particles
may be supposed to contain the memory of past changes, so the eschaton may be supposed to
contain the memory of every past change.
Yet it is difficult to see how memory could play a role in grounding the truth of any laws
without endowing memories with the kind of necessary connections that all Humeans reject.
Whether or not mnemonic impressions qualify as memories is surely consequent upon the laws
of nature, whereas super-Humeans who appealed to memory to ground the truth of these laws
would have to appeal to additional facts, over and above the positions of the particles, which
are somehow correlated with their positions in past time-slices.
In any case, I doubt that the eschaton holds any hope in store for super-Humeans, however
long their memories. Suppose they take the eschaton literally. In that case, they would have
to believe that some future time-slice t f will instantiate a primitive property of ‘finality’, such
that the primitive arrow of change will not point to a future time-slice at time t = t f . However,
such a move is unavailable to super-Humeans who embrace a strong form of structuralism:
by stipulation, there are no primitive or intrinsic properties in nature. Suppose they take the
eschaton metaphorically instead. In that case, they would have to deny that there is some time-
slice that is identical to the end of the world. If so, any law that depends for its truth upon the
eschaton could not literally be true, and super-Humeans could not be realists about laws. Thus
to take either horn of the temporal dilemma would be to undermine the super-Humean account
of the truth of the Bohmian law, either by abandoning its minimalism, or by abandoning its
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3.3 Persistence problem
My third objection concerns whether super-Humeanism can offer an ontology of particles,
given its structuralist conception of matter and Leibnizian conception of space. Specifically,
I am concerned with a question raised by Lazarovici ([2018], p. 82): ‘what provides for the
identity of the matter points over time?’.
Clearly, a world made of matter points need not be a world that contains particles, which
persist through time; it might contain flashes, which appear discontinuously throughout space.
Since matter points are constituted by distance relations, we cannot appeal to their enduring
properties in specifying their persistence conditions. Since matter points have no temporal
parts that are instantiated in spacetime, we cannot appeal to their perdurance. The persistence
conditions for an ontology of particles, in a world of matter points and primitive change, must
be cashed out at the level of the ontic structure.
However, it is impossible to formulate persistence conditions for particles in terms of the
persistence of the elements of this structure, since a set of distance relations has no identity
over and above its members, such that it can survive a change in its membership. A world in
which distance relations primitively change is a world in which one set of ontic relations come
into being (or ‘presentness’) followed by another, where each set has a different identity from
the previous set. Since there are no substances which instantiate these ontic relations, nor any
primitive spacetime in which they are embedded, there is nothing to unite these sets of relations
as a persisting subject of change.
A more promising solution might be to attempt to formulate persistence conditions for the
particles in terms of the trajectories traced by the matter points instead. In a super-Humean
world, it is a brute fact that the number of matter points in this world is fixed, and the distance
relations between them are non-vanishing. Suppose that primitive change were discrete, such
that, in the temporal interval (t1, t2) , where t2 > t1, there were only a finite number of numer-
ically distinct time slices. In that case, it would be a world of flashes rather than particles, in
which different matter points would appear at certain points along each Bohmian trajectory.
However, suppose primitive change in this world were continuous, such that, in the temporal
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would prima facie trace continuous trajectories that do not cross. We might think of Bohmian
particles, then, as persisting by enduring.
However, I have doubts about the coherence of conjuring the identities of particles from
their trajectories. To begin with, a set of trajectories need not represent continuous motion.
Consider a world, W1, in which there are three particles that follow continuous trajectories,
and a second world, W2, containing three particles whose trajectories result from splicing the
second half of Particle 1’s trajectory in W1 to the first half of Particle 2’s, and the second half
of Particle 2’s trajectory to the first half of Particle 1’s, while the motion of Particle 3 is left
unchanged. W2 is a world in which Particle 1 hops to the site of Particle 2, just as Particle 2
hops to the site of Particle 1. The trajectories in W2 are identical to those in W1. Nonetheless,
they represent discontinuous motion.
To eliminate the possibility that trajectories might represent discontinuous rather than con-
tinuous motion, super-Humeans will have to rule out the possibility of worlds like W2, even
though W2 is empirically indistinguishable from W1. In this respect, the super-Humean is in
the same boat as the weak structuralist who introduces haecceities to secure the identities of
the particles. In that case, the particles would not be matter points, but matter spaghetti, in
which the essence of each particle is cashed out in terms of a densely ordered set of sets of
distance relations. Yet this raises another difficulty concerning how distinct strands of matter
spaghetti compose a single configuration of particles. In order for two or more strands to con-
stitute Bohmian particles that trace continuous trajectories through space, we must find a way
of coordinating simultaneity relations between the distinct sets of distance relations that belong
to their different trajectories.
To tease out this difficulty, consider the case of a world of two particles, A and B, in which
particle A traverses a trajectory between two distinct points in space, (x1, x2), and particle B
traverses a trajectory between two different points, (x3, x4). In a super-Humean world in which
change is continuous, the essence of a strand of matter spaghetti must be supposed to be dense
in the spatial positions that constitute a trajectory. Yet why should we suppose that the order-
ing of positions in the interval (x1, x2), for one strand of spaghetti, should correspond to the
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mal increment δx in the position of A along its trajectory with each infinitesimal increment in
time δt, there is a corresponding infinitesimal increment in the position of B?7 The two strands
might be coordinated in such a way that, as particle A advances from the spatiotemporal point
(x1, t) to (x1 + δx, t + δt), particle B jumps discontinuously in space from one point to another;
for example, from (x3, t) to (x4, t + δt). In fact, there are an infinite number of ways of pairing
points in (x1, x2) with points in (x3, x4), and hence infinitely many more ways of making a world
of flashes rather than particles.
Or again, consider the possibility of a cyclic cosmos, of the kind contemplated in the 1920s
by Einstein, in which the universe endlessly repeats the same process of expansion and con-
traction, which takes place in a period T . Suppose Qt represents the configuration of parti-
cles at some moment t. In that case, Qt will be identical to the configuration after n periods,
Qt = QnT+t, where n is any positive integer. It follows that any matter point in a strand of
matter spaghetti A that is coordinated with a matter point in a non-identical strand B can be
coordinated with an infinite number of matter points in B, and likewise with an infinite number
of matter points in every strand of matter spaghetti. Why suppose, then, that the matter points
in Qt instantiate a real relation of simultaneity? Indeed, why suppose that different strands of
matter spaghetti compose a single particle configuration at all, such that every member of each
strand must be paired with a member in every other strand and coordinated in time?
At this point, super-Humeans may appeal to the A-theory of time, in order to impose a
preferred ordering upon all of the matter spaghetti and unite them within a single evolving
configuration. However, as I have suggested, this move comes at a theoretical cost: a super-
Humean world in which only one configuration of matter points exists at the present moment is
a world in which the laws of nature and propositions referring to objects that scientists interact
with in their experiments are left without truthmakers. The only alternative for super-Humeans
who appeal to matter spaghetti is to pile on additional brute facts: it must be a brute fact that all
of the matter spaghetti composes a single configuration, and it must be a brute fact that matter
points pair up in such a way that they constitute a world of particles that travel together through
space. In that case, super-Humeans will have to help themselves to uncountably many brute
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facts to build a world of 1086 particles.
I conclude that there is small hope of super-Humeans deriving the identities of particles
from their trajectories. Those who attempt to wrest themselves from the horns of the ‘temporal
dilemma’ concerning the nature of time will thus find themselves caught on the horns of a
‘persistence dilemma’ concerning the nature of space:
Persistence Dilemma: Either (i) abandon Leibnizian space, and embrace the At-At theory
of change, or (ii) retain primitive change, but embrace particles with haecceities.
By seizing the first horn of this dilemma, we might explain how there are particles that persist,
but must abandon any primitive notion of change: a particle that persists is one that perdures
by tracing a worldline in spacetime, while any change in a physical system is to be explained
by the instantiation of properties at different points in spacetime. However, super-Humeans
who take this option must give up both their ontological minimalism and their primitive notion
of change. How should the distance relations that constitute the matter points be embedded in
spacetime?
By seizing the second horn of the dilemma, we can explain how there are particles which
persist without abandoning a primitive notion of change: a particle may persist by enduring if it
has an haecceity that exists over and above the distance relations in which it stands. However,
super-Humeans who adopt this position must abandon their strong form of structuralism. How,
then, should they understand a particle’s capacity to change the distance relations in which it
stands? Thus to take either horn of the persistence dilemma would be to undermine the super-
Humean ontology of moving particles, either by abandoning its notion of primitive change, or
by abandoning its conception of matter. It appears the one-trick pony isn’t going anywhere
until it solves its identity crisis.
4 Conclusion
Super-Humeanism purports to offer a minimalist account of nature that supports an ontology
of physical objects and accommodates quantum phenomena, while avoiding a common objec-
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primitive ontology approach to quantum mechanics with ontic structural realism. According to
super-Humeans, macroscopic objects are composed of microscopic matter points, which follow
a Bohmian law of motion. These matter points are constituted by distance relations and they
undergo primitive change.
However, I have argued that super-Humean minimalism comes at a theoretical cost and
introduces conceptual problems. First, I argued that its notion of matter fails to discern be-
tween any number of Max Black worlds that contain symmetric particle configurations. Super-
Humeanism is thus saddled with the implausible modal claim that a Bohmian particle con-
figuration is necessarily asymmetric. Second, I argued that its parsimonious account of the
truthfulness of the Bohmian law of motion leads to a self-undermining dilemm concerning
the nature of time. For this law to be true, the particle configurations would have to support
necessary connections. Finally, I argued that the super-Humean account of the identities of the
Bohmian particles leads to a self-undermining dilemma concerning the nature of space. For
particles to persist, they must have some identity over and above the distance relations in which
they stand.
In short, it seems that super-Humeanism has problems which can only be solved by reject-
ing the minimalism imposed by its strong form of structuralism and lifting its Humean embargo
against necessary connections. Esfeld ([?], p. 7) admonishes philosophers against the ‘illusion’
of supposing that, by enriching our primitive ontology beyond matter points, we can expect to
achieve explanations that are any ‘deeper’ than those offered by super-Humeans. Yet it seems
that Humean philosophers who adopt super-Humean minimalism do not thereby acquire super-
powers for deflecting metaphysical trouble. This being the case, I suggest that metaphysicians
and philosophers of science should balance Esfeld’s injunction in favour of minimalism against
some advice often attributed to Einstein, namely, that our models should be as simple as possi-
ble, but not any simpler.
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